Blue Book

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***Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.***

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1. The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the [Charter of the United Nations](http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/), to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by [Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations](http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-un51.htm), will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

Article 6[[1]](#footnote-1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

* on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France[[2]](#footnote-2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
* on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

One of the very first things the debater can do to improve his persuasiveness to the judges (and hence, his chances of winning) is to learn how to organize and present his thoughts during his Constructive and Rebuttal speeches.

-from *Strategic Debate*

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

Questions for Discussion

1. The opening of the NATO treaty establishes some fundamental principles of the organization. What are these principles?
2. How does NATO relate to the United Nations? Article 1 positions NATO as a military strength, yet speaks of peace. How does this work in the real world?
3. Read Article 2. What language in this article directly conflicts with communism and socialist ideas? How can economic disputes be solved within NATO?
4. Article 5 sets the military ultimatum for the rest of the world. What will happen if one NATO country is attacked by another country outside of NATO? How does this help keep the opening principle of peace intact?
5. Articles 9 set up a governing body to oversee conflicts, and Article 10 sets up how to include new members. Describe how this body works. Do some research on this Council and explain how it has responded in the past.
6. How do the remaining articles appear to be purely administrative? Is there anything controversial in these final articles?

2. About NATO

The most valuable form of public speaking is debate.

* William Jennings Bryan

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a 57-year-old intergovernmental alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe. Every member nation retains their sovereignty while seeking consensus on political and military issues in their alliance. As you likely gathered from the previous chapter, the purpose of the alliance is to protect the interests of its member countries. NATO does this both militarily and politically. The treaty came into effect in 1949 after the fall of Nazi Germany and in reflection of the rise of Communist Russia. Political and military unity among free, Western nations was galvanized by NATO's formation.

NATO gathers under what they call the North Atlantic Council. Representatives of every member nation come together at times when times of concern call for a meeting of NATO. The Council deliberates over the issues at hand—oftentimes involving the actions of non-member countries—and seeks consensus for action to be taken.



Taken from NATO's website [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int).

History of NATO

Understanding the history of NATO will help in your understanding of the present dilemmas its existence faces. NATO formed in 1949 as a direct affront to the threatening expansion of Communist Russia. However, following the fall of the Iron Curtain in the 1980s, NATO has struggled to justify its existence. Major policy changes have been made by NATO and its member countries to persuade world policy. This has frustrated many non-member countries and, thankfully for us, has made for an interesting international policy topic.

Early developments and conflict in the North Atlantic (1949-1960)

The original NATO treaty was signed by 12 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. World War II was still in its clean-up stages. Nazism was soundly crushed by the unification of opposing political forces: the free-thinking West and the Communist East. These differences of political views got ugly as Communism spread over existing borders.

Wars sprung up in the early 1950s that tempted NATO's intervention. The Korean War prompted the United State's direct involvement to keep Communism from spreading through Southeast Asia. The Algerian War started in 1952 with strong support from Russia and other Communist countries. This influenced Greece and Turkey, two countries bordering Communist countries, to submit to NATO's treaty and become the first inductees into NATO in 1952, just three years after the signing of the original 12.

Many debaters don't realize how important word definitions are to winning policy debates. A poor definition of a key word at the beginning of an Affirmative speech – or worse, *no* definition – can make the difference between winning and losing. The Affirmative has the burden to prove that they understand, clearly explain, and exactly uphold the resolution. Clear definitions are essential to that task.

-from *Strategic Debate*

The Communist/West conflict continued to flare in 1955 when West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) was formed. This is when the Warsaw Pact formed. Eight countries joined forces as a direct opposing body to NATO: USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The heat of the fundamental differences between Communism and a free West was getting very hot. This set the stage for the Cold War that lasted for the next 40 years.

These beginning years of NATO were wobbly. The 1956 Suez crisis showed a weakness in the NATO alliance. Britain and France joined together to front Egypt's take over of the Suez Canal in an attempt to gain back control of oil trade with the Middle East. This stirred up incredible tensions between Britain/France alliance and a growing Egypt/Russia alliance. America did not fully support Britain's military move and, as a result of growing pressure to back down, led to the resignation of the Prime Minister of Britain and later to the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure (they rejoined in 1995). The world—especially the newly formed Warsaw Pact—saw NATO as a force that wasn't quite strong.

The USSR was on a roll through the 1950s. Russia crushed an uprising in Hungary the same year it threatened a war of the Suez Canal. Sputnik launched the Soviets into the space age as well as the ballistic missile competition with the US. The Russian dog Laika became the first animal to fly in space in 1958, and Russian Yuri Gagarin the first human just three years later. The decade wrapped up with Fidel Castro coming to power in Cuba, a significant blow to NATO. Cuba was the first North American Communist country and, it was feared in 1959, would not be the last.

The Cold War (1961-1989)

A signficant event in the escalation of the Cold War was the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The wall physically divided the eastern Communist controlled half of Berlin from the Western-controlled half of the city, blocking easterners seeking freedom from escaping to the West. It was not only a physical barrier but symbolically it represented the seeming permanence and fixed position of the isolated East from the free and open West. Though this was in Germany, the "world powers" were quickly recognized as the United States and Soviet Russia. Britain and France, after the failure of the Suez conflict, would not make military moves in the world without US blessing. The USSR, too, became the world's Communist decision maker due largely to its vast regional military power as well as its arsenal of nuclear weapons. and elsewhere.

The United States became all-too-aware of Communism's threat in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. For years the United States employed nuclear missiles in the U.K., Italy and Turkey. As a response, the USSR started to deploy missiles in the newly established Communist Cuba. This resulted in a "stare down" between the two countries that, at the time, was feared to trigger nuclear war. After the wobbly 1950s the outcome was anyone's guess. Kennedy and Kruschev were able to resolve the issue and avoid a cataclysmic nuclear war. This represented a turning point in the Cold War, a win for the American West.

Still, Article 5 of the NATO treaty had not yet been used. The Cuban Missile Crisis—as well as the wars of the east (Korea and the growing conflict in Vietnam) led to somewhat of a Plan B of Article 5. Known as "flexible response," NATO and the United States placed the nuclear option behind that of smaller military options. This helped build NATO's trained military as a strong option for dealing with Communist/West conflicts.

The Russian-led Warsaw Pact was in the somewhat awkward position of invading one of their own members, but they made an example out of Czechoslovakia by showing what would happen to any Communist country that considered leaving the Communist camp. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty>) with the goal of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons from going beyond the 5 nations who already had them at that time (Soviet Union, USA, China, France, Britain). History has shown that the USSR was finding such pileups as economically damaging to the Communist country. This development led to NATO/Warsaw Pact talks and the adoptions of SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) and the anti-ballistic missile systems agreements.

In 1973, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gathered. Thirty-five nations, including the two Super Powers, agreed to start talking about their differences. Russia saw it as a necessary move to keep control of its Balkan states. By 1976, the final stage of the CSCE made headway for respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The 70s were tough for Soviet Russia. They invaded Afghanistan and walked out of the US-Soviet strategic arms reduction talks. Then the Falklands War started in 1982. Gorbachev came to power soon after and initiated talks of reforming the Soviet Union. This also led to one of America's prolific leaders, Ronald Reagan, who saw the Soviets crumbling from within. Reagan's leadership led to success with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Reagan is accredited by many as the man who won the Cold War.

Post Cold-War NATO

Here's an easy way to test whether you're ready to do a 1AC: Put all your papers face-down on the desk and explain to someone else what your case is about, in general terms…If you understand it well enough to explain it without reference to notes, then you've made a good start.

-from *Strategic Debate*

You'd think everyone at NATO would call it a day, declare victory over Communism, and find other ventures in life to take on. It didn't happen for a few reasons. First, the Warsaw Pact didn't go away so quickly. The countries announced major reductions in conventional forces in 1988, but didn't actually dissolve till 1991. Second, even though communism was greatly reduced as a world influence, NATO continued on, for better or worse, trying to find other missions to perform other than to prevent a communist invasion of Western Europe. Third, NATO began positioning itself as a major player in the formation of the post-Cold War world. The years that followed the 1980s have changed how NATO behaves in the world.

NATO began defining itself as a peace-keeping agent. Its first big powwow was the unification of East and West Germany. It then launched the Partnership for Peace program in 1994. The peace didn't last long. In 1995, NATO intervened militarily in the civil war in Bosnia/Herzegovina. This was, ironically, the first military action by NATO in its history. Its 50th year in existence consisted of peace-keeping air raids on Kosovo and operations in Bosnia.

Terrorism became a central concern after the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001. Within 24 hours of the 9-11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 for the very first time in its history. The following year saw a galvanization of unity between Russia and NATO/United States. In 2002, NATO made the direct policy change to operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism. This was followed by major reforms to prepare itself against new threats in the world. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania all join NATO. Significant in its post-911 missions is the NATO Response Force (NRF), a force of air, sea and special forces that can be deployed quickly when needed. The NRF employs approximately 25,000 troops today.

NATO today

There are a number of positions NATO takes in the world today. These positions are as follows:

1. Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine and Balkans). NATO has been diligent in developing a strong relationship with Russia. The NATO-Russia Council formed four years ago and is still going strong. The NATO-Russia Newsletter January 2006 states, "We must unite efforts to develop a higher degree of consensus behind the NATO-Russia partnership, and ensure that it remains relevant to new challenges in the evolving security environment."

2. Mediterranean Region. Taking a look at the NATO country map at the beginning of this chapter, you'll see that NATO doesn't cover areas south of the Mediterranean Sea. NATO has justified its expanded scope of developing relationships with northern Africa because it sees Euro-Atlantic security at risk from these countries.

3. Military. Already mentioned, the NATO Response Force is positioned with 25,000 troops ready to go where NATO says to go. NATO sees this as a major component to its current reforms. In the August 2005 NATO briefing, the Alliance boasted of its military might: "The new military command structure is leaner, more flexible, more efficient, and better able to conduct the full range of Alliance missions."

4. Terrorism. This is the world's new threat. No longer does NATO or the US focus on the evil Iron Curtain, but rather on the threat of terrorism in the world. The 9-11 attacks were seen as a direct assault on the United States, and as a result NATO deployed troops to Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power and establish a democracy in that region. It is also currently involved in training Iraqi forces alongside the US.

5. The Environment. As if military security wasn't enough for NATO to worry about, many see NATO's role to expand into environmentalism. In a 2005 NATO briefing titled "The Environment and Security," NATO makes the argument that there is a link between environmental concerns and military security. "Even though the causes of conflict and insecurity are often complex," the brief says, "evidence suggests that environmental degradation and resource depletion are a source of tension in many regions of the world. Land degradation, climate change, water quality and quantity, and the management and distribution of natural resources (e.g. oil, forests, minerals) are factors that can contribute directly to conflict or be linked to them by exacerbating other causes such as poverty, migration, infectious diseases, poor governance and declining economic productivity. In sum, environmental problems can threaten human livelihoods and contribute to social and economic inequalities."

Questions for Discussion

1. What does "NATO" stand for?
2. What were the first 12 countries to join NATO? What countries have joined NATO over the years since 1949?
3. How have wars on Terrorism affected NATO and NATO’s actions? Have changes been made to improve this?
4. How does NATO make a difference in comparison to other organizations in the North Atlantic region? Has it improved over the Years?
5. Visit NATO's website ([www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)). What are its current missions and developmental quests?

3. Tying the Resolution to the Round

Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

We are often encouraged when we hear of students who don't have a clue what debate is all about, yet they take on the activity bravely, get to know it over time, and end up stellar communicators. We are also encouraged when we see parents make debate part of the curriculum for home school; the kids of these homes are the pride of their parents.

Debate is an entire sport full of complex rules, new terminology, and a host of jargon and rhetoric to go along with it. Students and parents recognize the genuine worth and value of debating, but wading through the how-to's is enough to scare off the most determined individual.

But take heart – many other students have taken on debate and done quite well. Once the basics are learned, debate can be one of the most enjoyable activities a student can participate in. So dive in and keep your eyes on the light at the end of the tunnel.

The Policy Resolution

This year's resolution, *Resolved:* *That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished,* calls for a plan to fix problems in the status quo. There are many "problems" with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and some of these problems are discussed later in this chapter. The affirmative team begins the round by delivering an 8-minute speech that 1) shows problems that exist today, 2) show that these problems won't go away without action, 3) provides a policy to fix the problems, and 4) proves that this new policy will do the job it claims it will do. A traditional policy case has the following format:

A. Harms (the significant problems in the status quo)

B. Inherency (the problems won't go away if policy stays the same)

D. Plan (the proposed policy)

E. Solvency (the policy solves the harms)

This year's NCFCA resolution is incredibly simple. The first half of the resolution identifies the agent that is central for change. "That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)…" The debater will provide a thorough understanding of NATO, its operations and its duties in the world. The resolution sets the stage—NATO.

The second half of the resolution, "…should be significantly reformed or abolished," gives the affirmative team the impetus to make the change. The team will typically define significantly and then choose either reform or abolition as its methods for change. The following highlights narrow the scope of the resolution down to five case types.

**1. Why NATO?** The resolution throws in abolition as a viable option for cases, and this is definitely one of the options for debaters. The reason for the existence of NATO, as highlighted in the previous chapter, was the fear of aggression by the Soviet Union. The demise of the USSR 15 years ago will be an important factor in the debates this year. Many scholars think that NATO is spending most of its energy and money looking for new missions to justify its existence. One asked: If NATO did not already exist as a left-over from the Cold War, would anyone think it was necessary to create it today?

**2. Relations with Russia.** The relationship between NATO and Russia is incredibly complex. Soviet Russia consisted of 40 years of propaganda that engrained an anti-American image into the heart of Russia. Much of NATO's present function is simply to re-educate Russia into making the West an ally once again. It isn't hard for affirmative teams to suggest ideas for improved relations with NATO's former adversary. However, there are still many things NATO is doing that well-prepared negative teams can come up with to show that the status quo is at least trying to do many things to improve relations.

**3. New Members.** Now 26 countries large, it is difficult to imagine NATO's origin of only a dozen nations. NATO keeps expanding and inviting new members into the alliance. Is this a good thing or a bad thing? If NATO is truly the world's most successful organization at spreading peace and security, maybe more members equals more global peace and security. On the other hand, more members means more potentially dangerous military commitments (will American troops die for Slovenia?), more military spending for countries that may not be able to afford it, and more defense against…what, exactly?

**4.** **Other International Organizations.** How does NATO relate to other organizations, such as: the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the CSCE explained in the previous chapter), the African Union, just to name a few? Affirmatives can argue that NATO should take on more of the work that these organizations may be trying to do. Just as strongly, these teams can argue that NATO should step aside and allow these other agents handle jobs that are arguably beyond NATO's scope as a European defensive alliance.

**5. Organization.** How does NATO make its decisions? How do members handle one another when they disagree? How does NATO pay for its operations? How does NATO control its military forces when multiple nations' resources are pooled together under a single commander? These and many other issues go to the heart of how NATO functions and many of them are ripe for reform. There are always better ways of running any large bureaucracy if you look hard enough.

Defining the Terms of the Resolution

Clear definitions of the key words in the resolution do several things for the Affirmative. First, they outline the scope of the proposition to show that the Affirmative subject area fits into the proposition, proving that the Affirmative is topical. Second, they preempt a smart Negative strategy of asserting their own definitions of words the Affirmative left out, and then claiming the plan is non-topical or extra-topical because (surprise!) it doesn't meet the *Negative's* definitions. If the Affirmative has staked out clear, reasonable definitions in the 1AC, a reasonable judge will allow the Affirmative to proceed under their own definitions unless the Negative shows why they're faulty. If they came from reputable sources, that will be hard to do and the Affirmative will win on topicality.

As already stated, this year's NCFCA resolution is a simple one. There will not be many squabbles over the definition of NATO. The take from Wikipedia should be fine:

From Wikipedia (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nato>):  
  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also called the North Atlantic Alliance, the Atlantic Alliance or the Western Alliance, is an international organisation for collective security established in 1949, in support of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, DC, on 4 April 1949. Its headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium.

One term that will always come up in the debates is significantly. This isn't to be confused with the stock issue "significance." Novices often confuse the two, but debaters who understand the difference early on are debaters who can lead the judge to positive ballots. The first, *significantly,* means that every affirmative team is tasked with making a change that is *significant.* The stock issue, *significance,* means that the affirmative team needs to show the harms they are solving are *significant* harms.

This year's topic clearly sets the rules for the affirmative team by giving them two plan options: reform or abolish. Squabbles over whether "abolition" is really "reform" are (thankfully) not going to be part of this year's debates. It is interesting how weighty the term "abolish" is to this year's resolution. Blue Book has one case that calls for the all-out abolition of the organization. Note, however, that it isn't how "abolish" is defined that will be the negative response to such a case; it will be the defense of NATO's good work that will be more persuasive to the judge.

"Reform" leaves the door wide open for all sorts of policy changes to the organization, which could include abolishing certain NATO programs. Since the scope of NATO has grown so big in the past several decades, affirmative teams have a lot of sand to play in. Negative teams, with the help of Blue Book, will have many negative briefs to rebut with.

Keeping Your Research Up-to-Date

There are a few things debaters can do to make sure research is kept current. First, study the research provided in this book. The Blue Book is meant to be an aid—not a substitute—to the hard work involved in being a thorough debater. The evidence briefs in the back of the book are meant to make the debater a NATO expert.

Second, continue your research and discussion beyond the Blue Book. Know the pieces of evidence in this book, but be sure to continue your study elsewhere. You may find evidence that either supports or counters the evidence here. The Blue Book has become a standard in NCFCA debate, arguably the stepping stone to the year's topic, so countering the standard is a wise strategy for every debater.

Third, keep posted with articles and resources that become available throughout the year. The Midseason Debate Briefs will be released January 1, 2007, and will provide a ton of evidence and cases that will definitely give debaters a winning edge. The debater with this collection will be a step ahead of the rest, far more prepared in the debate rounds than his or her competitor.

Organizing Research

Ultimately, [when cross-examining], you want to get to a point where you ask a question that shows a missing link, a logical lapse, a tag line not supported by the quote, or an inconsistency between two parts of their case. And with these ideas in mind, you should be able to think of things to ask besides "How are you going to get enough funding?" or "Tell me again who enforces your plan."

-from *Strategic Debate*

After you have read a number of interesting articles and documents, you will begin to *tag*the quotations you have highlighted. This is simply paraphrasing the evidence into one sentence. Follow the tag with a proper *citation* including author, credibility of the author (optional, but could be helpful in a round), title of article/book/magazine, the date, and page number (if applicable). The quote is then the essence of this evidence *block*.

Before too long, you will begin to categorize and classify your evidence. This is the beginning of a filing system for the debate team. Group the evidence into topical sections. With evidence blocks grouped into an organized filing system, the team will be quick in the round to bring credibility. Be neat and tidy in your filing. The key here is *retrieval*, not necessarily *filing away.*

Your research will not have an "end." You will continue to read newspapers, magazines, Internet postings, and e-mail forwards all year long. Be sure to bookmark [*http://www.trainingminds.org*](http://www.trainingminds.org)*,* Training Minds Ministry’s Web site, on your home computer for updates and current articles on the year’s topic. Pull the evidence when you see it. Tag it, cite it, and file it. Continual research is necessary throughout the debate season. It is part of the learning process as well as part of the fun of outwitting your opponent!

Questions for Discussion

1. Memorize the policy resolution. Explain the four bullets of the traditional policy case (harms, inherency, plan, solvency).
2. Using a Webster’s dictionary, look up the other definitions in the resolution that were not defined in this chapter. Find a Black’s Law Dictionary and look up the same words. How are they different? Could some arguments be excluded or included by narrowing a definition down to one certain way?
3. Brainstorm some keywords surrounding NATO with your club or your coach. Go to the leader in search engines, *http://www.google.com*, on the Internet. What kinds of results do you find?
4. How can you keep your research up-to-date?
5. The debates of the year will likely fall into what five categorical groups? Explain these five groups.

4. Affirmative Strategies

We are not short of problems. I can assure you that we have plenty of them.

* Sec. General of NATO Lord Ismay  
  State of NATO, October 1956

All teams will take the resolution and develop an affirmative case. Working together, teams develop a speech that identifies the problems with current laws governing NATO, and follow by proposing a plan to solve these problems. The speech is written and re-written, practiced and revised, to be a total speaking time of eight minutes long.

A tournament typically has four to six rounds, but teams will debate the affirmative only a few times. In other rounds, teams will debate on the negative side.Using stacks of evidence and resources they prepared in their home school or debate club, the team attacks the affirmative case following the opening affirmative speech. The negative team raises doubts over the effectiveness of the affirmative team's case, the necessity or longevity of their plan, or the problems proposed in their speech. Negative strategies are discussed in the next chapter.

The round continues with further constructive speeches and rebuttals. During the round, a judge (typically a debate coach or objective parent) is carefully weighing all the arguments. He or she then casts a ballot declaring the winner. The debaters are then off to the next round to go at it again.

Here is a schematic of how the round goes. A more detailed account of the responsibilities of each speaker is covered in Chapter 5.

**1st Affirmative Constructive** (8 minutes) the affirmative team gives their case

Cross-examination (3 minutes) the negative asks questions of the affirmative

**1st Negative Constructive** (8 minutes) the negative gives case against the affirmative

Cross-examination (3 minutes) the affirmative asks questions of the negative

**2nd Affirmative Constructive** (8 minutes) the affirmative continues to promote case

Cross-examination (3 minutes) the negative questions the affirmative

**2nd Negative Constructive** (8 minutes) the negative continues their attacks

Cross-examination (3 minutes) the affirmative questions the negative

**1st Negative Rebuttal** (5 minutes)

**1st Affirmative Rebuttal** (5 minutes)

**2nd Negative Rebuttal** (5 minutes)

**2nd Affirmative Rebuttal** (5 minutes)

As you can see, the debate round is an exhausting 70 to 80 minutes long. Each team is allowed five minutes of preparation time to use as they wish, but it is hardly enough to make for a comfortable time. The adrenaline flows swiftly as the debaters jump back-and-forth on the topic. It does not take long for a student to get hooked into its excitement.

Creating the Affirmative Case

This book shows how to create a traditional affirmative case. There are other types of cases, and all debate teams should be aware of these types of cases (there are more types in the index of this book). But for the purpose of training efficiently, we have chosen to show you the traditional format. For more information on nontraditional affirmative cases, see *Jeub’s Complete Guide to Speech & Debate* or Vance Trefethen's book, *Strategic Debate.* Both of these books released their 2nd editions in 2005 and would be a helpful addition to your debate book library (see http://www.monumentpublishing.com/store).

On Training Minds Ministry's website are *free* case templates, specifically designed to start a case off by scratch. These outlines are downloadable in Word and RTF formats enabling students to create a case right into their own document. See our downloads page at http://www.trainingminds.org/downloads to download your case templates.

The traditional case, also called a "harms-solvency" case, follows a popular plan structure used in academic debate. A clear understanding of the most popular format is key to understanding all the formats. The four parts are *definitions, harms (including both significance and inherency), plan* and *advantages.*

Definitions

Personal or public policy decisions based on guesswork, uninformed opinion, unqualified advice, personal whim, or emotional impulse are unlikely to lead to success. If there is no rational and informed basis for decisions, then there is no purpose having a debate. Debates that do not involve evidence are not debates at all, they are simply quarrels.

-from *Strategic Debate*

As already covered earlier, *definitions* are self-explanatory: they are the definitions of key terms in the resolution. Do not make the mistake of using too much of your time with definitions. If you are challenged on the specific meaning of a word, you can always whip out the dictionary and define it for the negative later in the 2AC. This section of your speech should simply narrow the debate to the resolution at hand. No more than a minute should be spent on definitions.

Harms

Harmsare more of the crux of the case. The harms are the problems the affirmative will claim exist because the resolution is not being presently adopted. These are some examples of the types of tags you would have heading an evidence card. Here are some examples:

* NATO expansion creates serious and unnecessary risks
* US intervention to NATO policy causes dangerous consequences
* Out of Area Missions hurt NATO's credibility with the world

When presenting the harms, the debater will need to remember to show their significance and inherency. First, show that the harm is a significant harm that is hurting America. Second, show that it is an inherent harm, meaning the problem is not going to go away without action. The evidence supporting the claims above may show significance, but are they inherent?

Plan

The next thing to do is provide a plan to fix the harms. This, however, is not the crux of the case like the harms and advantages are. There is no need to drown the plan section with evidence and proof. Simply state your plan in the following outline:

**Mandates:** The "law" you would pass to implement the plan. State this in your own words. You may do more than one thing. For example, in "The Case for a Defense-Only Alliance," you can require all intervention by NATO military forces to be only in response to a violent attack against a member nation and only against those who attacked it.

**Agency:** This is the government body you will be using or creating to carry out the implementation of your plan. For example: "All the NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters."

**Funding:** Where is the money coming from? "No new funding is necessary under my plan," "Funding shall come from all member countries," or "Funding will come from the reduction of military action," may be your line here.

**Enforcement:** When people break the rules, who will carry out the punishment? Dealing with international law makes this a little trickier than simply fining or imprisoning wrongdoers. Be sure to clarify this. Example: "Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office."

Advantages or Solvency

Lastly, you will wrap up the speech showing the advantages of the plan, as well as "solving" the harms presented earlier. This will carry out the voting issue of solvency: the plan solves the harms. Very commonly, the advantage will match up evenly with the harms. If Harm A stated that people are dying, Advantage A would show how the plan kept people from dying. Just like with harms, the advantages will have evidence showing this to be true.

You will spend a great deal of time developing, rewriting, proofing, etc. your debate case. Like an artist who is never really "finished" with the art piece, you will never really be "finished" with your debate case. As evidence is brought up, read in the news, or discovered surprisingly in a debate tournament, you will return to cut, revise and research some more. Your case will change with time, and it should as you grow to understand NATO and international issues related to the organization.

Other Considerations in Developing Your Affirmative Case

Every year the debate topic carries unique challenges for debate teams. Much of the challenge revolves around the stock issues (also called "voting" issues). Understanding these particulars helps build strong debaters. Teams who are prepared to understand these issues are better prepared at persuading the judge and winning the round.

The Introduction

There's no hard and fast rule about what a debater must say to introduce himself. Some debaters, pressed for time due to the excessive lengths of their 1AC and a perceived need to talk at full speed, are leaving out the introduction altogether. As an old-timer, I like to hear a good (but brief) introduction. Tell me who you are and tell me a little story about what you're going to be introducing today.

Some introductions go right into the subject matter of the Affirmative case. Here's an example:

In the real world, there are millions of experts, and among those can be found someone who will say just about anything on any subject whatsoever. That doesn’t mean there is no such thing as absolute truth in the real world. But it does mean that in the realm of quoting from "experts," two can play that game and every quote from one expert can be answered by a quote from another expert. It is the debater’s job to A) present that opposing expert's quote to the judge; and B) tell the judge why that opposing expert's response is better than what the other team’s expert said.

-from *Strategic Debate*

Maybe Leo Tolstoy said it best: "What an immense mass of evil must result from allowing men to anticipate what might happen." NATO's original purpose was to defend Western Europe from outside attack, and it performed that job perfectly. But in the 1990s, NATO abandoned that successful strategy in favor of trying to guess what might happen and using armed intervention against those who had neither attacked nor threatened to attack any of its members. Recognizing the failure of NATO's current direction, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

Fiat

"Fiat" is the key to enabling debate resolutions that have the word "should" in them. Policy resolutions always say that somebody "should" change a policy. Affirmative teams get up in the 1AC and say, "Yes, we 'should' change that policy and here's the change we 'should' make..." They then offer solvency arguments or advantages that are based on the assumption that the plan is implemented, and the Negative team offers disadvantages also based on the same assumption. Assuming this plan goes into effect, what would happen? The ability to make that assumption – the ability to declare that this plan gets enacted with an Affirmative ballot – is "fiat."

This gives some magical leeway to Affirmative teams with this year’s resolution. As explained in Chapter 1, the NATO resolution is an international resolution, not a domestic one solely dependent on the United States. Since this is the case, the Affirmative team can claim that "all member countries" will adopt their plan. Since the affirmative is never required to prove that their plan "would" take effect, only that it "should," they don’t have to prove that member countries within NATO would ever join and accept the plan within the Council. Ultimately, this keeps debaters on track to debate the specifics of the case without running down the rabbit trail of debating whether or not the mandate would be passed.

Questions for Discussion

1. If studying this book in a group setting, have more experienced debaters share their experiences of debating with others. What were some great affirmative arguments given in previous years' rounds?
2. Review the schematic of a debate round. Discuss what the responsibilities of the speakers are.
3. During the debate speeches, what can those who are *not* speaking be doing?
4. What are the harms? How do they relate to the end of the case?
5. Explain all the components of the plan. Discuss how any missing elements would bring a case under question in a round.
6. Write an affirmative debate case. Use this case to refer to when studying the next chapter on negative strategies. Keep in mind the affirmative arguments when studying the negative attacks against it. Are there ways you can strengthen your case?
7. What are some particular concerns with the stock issues in this year's debate topic?

5. Negative Strategies

Winston Churchill, again, said that you would always depend on the United States to do the right thing in the end, but not before it had tried all the available alternatives.

– Chris Patten, European Commission  
"The State of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership"

Novice teams often favor the affirmative side of debating because they have ample time to prepare a good case. However, the more experienced debater sometimes learns to prefer the negative side. The negative team carries *presumption* in the round, meaning that if the affirmative side fails to prove change is needed, we "presume" things should remain the same. This allows for creative flexibility that the affirmative does not share.

Some Basics to Keeping the Affirmative on the Run

Whether you are an experienced team or a novice team, it is nice to be reminded of basics to negative strategy. The following are ways the Negative team can position themselves to counter Affirmative cases in a debate round.

Defending the Status Quo

In preparing for the debate round, gather evidence that justifies current policies and agencies. Because you have prepared evidence attacking the status quo, you will be familiar with the common arguments. Tag and block the evidence and develop folders in your evidence box that justifies the status quo.

The committee that writes this year's resolution chose this topic because it is interesting *and* there are problems with the status quo. Because of this, defending the status quo may be difficult, but a good negative team will prepare to do so anyway. If you and your debate club choose to host a learning workshop, this is a good time to interview government officials about the benefits of the status quo.

On-Case Arguments

Taking the bull by the horns and addressing the case head-on is making on-case arguments. This is the strategy of addressing the stock issues of topicality, significance, inherency, and solvency. If any of these stock issues are lost by the affirmative, the judge will likely vote negative. If you think about it, this makes sense. If any of these issues fail, the entire plan falls to nothing.

There has been a growing concern in the NCFCA community about the validity of stock issues. I (Vance) was judging at a tournament last year and a disturbed parent/judge approached me in the hallway and reported that they had seen an 'official' statement about judging from NCFCA that says something like judges "may" use the stock issues to evaluate the round and decide a winner. The words "may use" are instead of "should" use, or "must" use.

We realize that what's said in orientation or on a handout can produce a long-term shift in the direction of judging and/or the expectations of students. Students may change their strategy or approach to debating based on the expectations that appear to be official in nature. This is an area of legitimate concern.

There is just as legitimate of a concern that stock issues can become so ossified as dry terminology that they lose their relevance and become just jargon that people recite without knowing why. Debaters who enter a round screaming "stock issues" to judges who haven't a clue what that means aren't exactly being persuasive. In fact, this league prides itself with a pool of lay judges (that is, judges who have never heard of, say, "inherency"), so debaters and coaches can imagine the frustration when losses concur because judges didn't understand stock issues. If I (Chris) had a dime for every time I heard a student complain about a judge that was "supposed" to vote on a stock issue, I'd be a wealthy man!

We've collectively been around a long time and have seen debate theories come and go. At the end of every crusading theory, sooner or later, the same old structural aspects to policy making decisions rears its beautiful, truthful head:

1. Are the "harms" (or let's call them problems or shortcomings or lack of achievements if we can't use stock issue terminology) in the Status Quo significant?
2. Is the SQ doing anything about them or doing anything like our Affirmative plan? (we used to call this "inherency")
3. Would this plan actually solve, improve, or achieve the benefits it claims? (I still call this "solvency")
4. Does this plan fit within the boundaries of the resolution? (topicality)
5. Would there be unexpected side-effects if we adopted this plan? (disadvantages)

You can rename them, avoid talking about them, wish they would go away, or be too cool for them, but policy debates will always come back to these issues. Why? Because they are in fact *the essence of how public decision making happens in the real world*. Debate has these things because the real world has them, not because old fuddy-duddies insist on it. Adults use these issues every day when interacting with others to make decisions on the job or to evaluate political policies at election time.

Debate takes persuasion and melds it with evidence and logic, glued to a political policy topic. It takes all 4 elements of those: persuasion, logic, evidence, and adherence to a public policy topic, to win a debate. That's how you judge a policy debate round... if it's anything else, it may be a competitive event and may have some value, but it won't be a debate about public policy that has any application to the real world.

Disadvantages

When the judge is deciding who to vote for at the end of the round, disadvantages give the judge a "reason" – besides just "presumption" – to vote Negative. And if the disadvantages are significant and have provable harms and impacts, then the judge may find that the disadvantages outweigh any solvency and advantages that the Affirmative team carried through the round.

-from *Strategic Debate*

An extension to defending the status quo is showing how the affirmative plan will bring about unforeseen harms. The negative can claim that *even if* the affirmative solves its harms, greater harms will come about regardless. These are called *disadvantages*. All policy plans will risk disadvantages, and a good negative team will train themselves to run organized and effective "disads."

A disadvantage needs to be simply and logically structured. There are three crucial parts of a well-structured disad: *link, brink,* and *impact.* The negative will *link* the specific part of the affirmative plan that causes the harm to the disad presented. Next, a prediction – called *brink* – will be made as to when this disad will come about. Lastly, the negative will show the *impact* of the disad.

A good negative team will have disadvantages prepared in advance. The evidence provided in this book is categorized to specifically address common disadvantages to the various cases. Take, for example, the tags for the disadvantages for a defensive-only case, found in the negative briefs under "international intervention – bad":

* Aggressive strategy triggers Russian response
* Intervention violates human dignity, freedom, and human rights
* Intervention fuels global resentment
* Intervention fuels terrorism

Minor Repair

The negative may choose to fix the current system a little without adopting the significant change the affirmative proposes. This is called a *minor repair*. If the negative team shows that this minor repair (which still needs to be proven is *not* a "significant" change) solves the problems the affirmative team is claiming, the judge will see no reason to vote affirmative. Presumption will be on the negative side, and therefore the negative will win.

However, the negative team must be careful not to grant all the affirmative harms. If too many minor repairs are called for, the judge may agree that the status quo is so messed up that major structural change *is* needed. Only introduce minor repairs if the negative sees the affirmative case is so outlandish that something much less radical would do just fine.

Counterplan

The negative team does have the option to agree with everything the affirmative says *except* the adoption of their specific plan. This is risky, for if you admit that the affirmative harms exist and a change in the status quo is needed, what does the negative team sacrifice? You guessed it: *presumption.* Once a counterplan is offered, presumption cannot be claimed.

Some say counterplans are never wise, but we disagree. As stated earlier, there are many ways to beat the affirmative team. When adopting a counterplan, many of those avenues are cut off. The negative needs to agree that the harms exist, that they are significant, that they are inherent to the status quo, and that a change in the status quo is necessary. But sometimes a team will meet up with a great affirmative team who does not have a very good idea to fix the system, or a plan that is in its very nature risky and questionable.

There are some specific rules in running a counterplan. First, the plan needs to be *non-topical*, meaning the plan does not adopt the resolution. There have been some recent debate theorists out there who have said a *topical* counterplan is admissible. How should an affirmative team reply to such a claim? Call it ridiculous. A topical counterplan is affirming the resolution. "Therefore, Judge, vote Affirmative because the negative team is affirming the resolution." Case closed. Negative teams, don't run topical counterplans.

[On Counterplans done right:] The Negative has hijacked the topic away from the Affirmative and is now conducting the debate on their turf. They've even trumped the Affirmative's harms by raising (and solving!) harms of their own that sound a lot worse than what the Affirmative was claiming. Despite having no evidence against the Affirmative harms, the Negative now stands a good chance of winning.

-from *Strategic Debate*

Second, the plan must have mandates, agency, funding, and enforcement just like an affirmative plan. This is likely why some have resisted running counterplans—it's a lot of work to stuff into your timed speeches. Not only do you need to make all your on-case arguments, but you need to run an entire "non-topical affirmative" plan too.

And third, the counterplan must show how the advantages from the counterplan are greater than the advantages of the affirmative plan.

CAUTION: do not use a counterplan as a standard negative case. Not every affirmative team will have a radical plan. Running a counterplan with a similar affirmative plan will make it appear like you are splitting hairs. A counterplan is an alternative to attacking the stock issues of significance and inherency. It can be pulled off, but negative teams should never solely rely on it.

Specific NATO Perspectives

With the basics aside, we can now focus on specific negative strategies pertaining to the NATO resolution to help in securing negative ballots in your debate rounds.

Abolition of NATO

NATO can be taken in many directions by Affirmatives this year. Debaters must be prepared to love NATO in one Negative round and then despise it in the next, all the while denying the proposition. This is because the proposition mentions both "reform" of NATO as well as abolishing it. If Affirmatives only had to abolish NATO, Negative preparation would be easy. But "reform" can go in many directions, making Negative preparation much more complex, and the debate season much more interesting and educational.

If the Affirmative chooses to abolish NATO, Negatives have two zones in which they can move during their speeches. The easiest is a generic defense of NATO, showing all its good qualities, disadvantages of doing without it, etc. You might win some rounds that way, but you might lose some too, because abolition-minded Affirmatives are going to have generic material of their own to respond to the problems of doing without NATO.

The second line of defense against abolition takes more preparation: A thorough, researched understanding of the *reasons why* NATO should be abolished and a specific evidential response tailored to the harms the Affirmative raises (or advantages they claim will happen) that will justify NATO abolition. Different abolition cases will offer different justifications for an Affirmative ballot.

For example, one Affirmative team may justify abolishing NATO in order to gain a better working relationship with Russia. A sharp Negative team will respond not only with generic "NATO is good" evidence, but also evidence denying the need for or solvency of improvements in the Russia relationship. But another Affirmative team might justify abolition on the grounds of wasted defense spending, while another might justify it on the grounds of some foreign policy hazards caused by entangling alliances or overseas intervention backlash. In those cases, Negatives should again combine generic NATO support evidence with evidence specific to the causes that the Aff believes justify abolition, and those specific justifications might be different in every debate.

If you hear that some of your competitors are running "Abolish NATO" cases, try to find out what justifications they are using before you meet them in competition, not just the fact that they are abolishing NATO. Negatives who answer head-on the specific justification presented in the 1AC give the judge a powerful impression of preparedness and sharp debating, and have a much higher chance of earning a Negative ballot than they would with only generic "NATO is good" evidence alone.

Counterplans

This year's Blue Book is unique in that we offer three different counterplans in the Negative Briefs section -- the most we have ever had in one book before. But this year's resolution, which involves the international organization NATO, easily lends itself to one of the classic forms of counterplan that has been used by many Negative debaters over the years: The "Alternate Actor." These aren't appropriate for every Negative round, but they may be just the right tool to pull out of the box to win a difficult round when the Affirmative wants to use NATO to solve some squirrelly problem in the world. If the Negative cannot defeat their harms, sometimes the best approach is to join the Affirmative in accepting the harms but countering that a different agency could do the plan better.

Anytime the resolution suggests action on the world stage by a nation or international organization, it is an invitation to Negative teams to deny only that part of the resolution that specifies the actor, and offering a different actor instead. In this case, the Affirmative's actor is NATO, and they may propose that NATO should do something to solve some problem or achieve some advantage in the world. Negatives have the option of opposing the Affirmative's plan and denying the resolution by saying: "No -- NATO should not do that. Someone else should do it instead." The Negative will then claim all the advantages of the Affirmative plan by solving its harms, but they will also claim to do it better or to avoid disadvantages by doing it with a different actor (for example, a different international organization) that can do a better job.

Use all the time on the clock. Experienced debaters NEVER leave time on the clock at the end of the speech – instead, they are desperate for more time and are always running out. Read more evidence to support your points, if you have it, rather than saving it for later and not filling up a speech now.

-from *Strategic Debate*

The first counterplan we offer this year is the "EU Counterplan," a proposal for the European Union to do the plan instead of NATO. The EU Counterplan is better than NATO for two reasons. First, Europeans support the EU better than NATO, and public support is essential to the success of any military mission. Since the EU is better supported, it is more likely to succeed. Second, Russia trusts the EU more than it trusts NATO. If NATO starts doing things in the world, they risk alienating Russia and that's a bad thing to do right now. Why not do it through the EU and improve relations with Russia, while achieving the same solvency as the Affirmative plan?

The second counterplan available is the "UN Counterplan," which suggests that the United Nations should do the plan instead. The UN is better than NATO primarily because it represents the global community instead of the interests of one regional alliance or, even more troublesome, the interests of just the United States. Even though NATO is an alliance of 26 nations, NATO projects the image of US imperialism because the US is such a big part of NATO. Other countries view NATO intervention as just another example of the US telling the rest of the world what to do. In addition, the Affirmative can fiat that NATO takes action, but they cannot fiat that the international community agrees with it. But if the same plan is done through the UN, it gains acceptance and legitimacy in the eyes of the world and sets a better example for future global crisis situations.

The third counterplan is the "US Unilateral" counterplan. This one argues that NATO is too weak, cumbersome and ineffective to get the job done effectively and that the best way is for the US to simply go it alone. European forces are inadequate and ineffectual and the restrictions NATO members put on their use make it easier and more likely to succeed if the US bypasses NATO and does the mission itself.

Spread of Democracy

A frequent guest star in many debate rounds this year will be that superstar of US foreign policy giving a guest appearance at NATO: Spread of Democracy. Affirmatives will put SoD on stage as the value, justification, criterion, or advantage to be gained by voting for their plan. Negatives must learn to get Mr. Democracy off stage gently, without hurting his feelings or offending the judge (he is a likeable fellow, after all), but firmly showing him the exit and reclaiming the stage for themselves and their trusted companion Mr. Status Quo.

How can we prove that tired old Status Quo is a better player than Spread of Democracy in his star-spangled jump-suit and fancy top hat? That depends on what role the Affirmative wants SoD to play. In one story line, NATO strengthens existing or new democracies that join or remain in NATO, and by strengthening or expanding NATO we uphold, strengthen, or solidify democracy within Europe. This is particularly important, we are told, for the new democracies of Eastern Europe that have only recently come out of the dark night of communism.

Negative teams have some facts to debunk that myth. First, there are lots of European countries that have been practicing and upholding democracy for quite a long time without ever considering joining NATO. Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria are some examples. If they could survive the turmoil and tensions of the last two generations with their democracies intact and without NATO membership, isn't it likely others could as well? Especially with much less tension and no threat of all-out war in Europe now that the Cold War is over. Who exactly is threatening to take away democracy from these fragile new democracies if they don't join NATO?

The other problem with Spread of Democracy in Europe is that NATO requires countries to already be democracies before they join NATO. Negatives can argue that it puts the cart before the horse to claim that NATO is spreading democracy when you must already have democracy before NATO will accept you.

But Spread of Democracy has another song he sometimes brings out on stage -- old timers like me might remember it from the early-1970's Coca-Cola advertisements: "I'd Like To Teach The World To Sing" (in perfect harmony.... you remember?) Getting democracy spread around the world can happen better and faster if NATO projects power in places where democracy is lacking. This is the new mission of NATO now that threats to democracy have pretty much vanished in Europe. Notice that this song conflicts sharply with the song above about how NATO is essential to European democracy, but let's move on.

"Signposting" refers to classifying an argument under the stock issue to which it pertains and giving a brief summary of the argument. It is essential to effective, winning debate. If you don't know what stock issue a piece of evidence pertains to (does it show inherency? defeat solvency? is it a disad?) then you have no business reading it, because you don't know what you're talking about.

-from *Strategic Debate*

Can NATO really spread democracy to the world or vital parts thereof? First of all, should it even try? The 26 nations who comprise NATO have to agree on missions before they can be undertaken, and it's a challenge to get 26 nations to even agree on what day of the week it is, much less to agree on a mission and how to accomplish it. But assuming the Affirmative fiats away the agreement problem, does NATO have the manpower and resources and coordination to do any more missions? Some argue that it's already stretched so thin that it simply cannot do more. Others point out that the operational aspects of 26 nations cooperating on difficult missions are so complex that you're better off without allies than with them. Affirmatives are welcome to fiat that they do a mission, but they cannot fiat that it will be successful.

Spread of Democracy promises more than he can deliver. One of the big advantages is allegedly a reduction in terrorism through improvement in civil societies in troubled lands. Democracy, the theory goes, reduces tensions in a violence-plagued society, and gives everyone a chance for their voice to be heard, thus increasing stability and reducing terrorism. It's easy to put that theory to the test: Which nation suffers more terrorist incidents every year? A) the world's largest democracy, India? B) the world's largest non-democracy, China? Not even close, it's India. Democracy may be a wonderful thing, but it's no antidote for instability, terrorism and violence. Just ask anyone in Baghdad, if you feel it's safe to go there.

Spread of Democracy plans have some big disadvantages that come out from under the rocks if you start stirring things up too much. In 2003 everyone thought Iraq would be well on the way to having a stable democracy by 2006. But Spread of Democracy ran up against some roadblocks that should have been expected, namely indigenous resentment and terrorist backlash. It turns out that lots of countries and peoples don't appreciate it when Western powers, particularly the US, come in and start telling them what to do. Even when it's motivated by good intentions and even when it's "for their own good." Spread of Democracy has an evil twin named Spread of Terrorism, who likes to show up everywhere Spread of Democracy goes, and judges need to be told about that.

What About Asia?

We include Negative briefs about east Asian countries in Blue Book this year because we suspect some Affirmatives will write plans dealing with them and their relationship to NATO. Perhaps South Korea will be invited to join NATO, or NATO will establish some kind of cooperation with Taiwan, or an alliance could be formed against China, or dozens of other possibilities. We're not sold on the value of those cases, which is why we don't have them among our Affirmative briefs, but Negatives should be prepared to argue against them.

To that end, we offer several Negative briefs on the following subjects:

ASIAN COUNTRIES JOINING NATO - shows that there is no threat and that NATO could not solve for it even if there were a threat. The biggest strength of this brief is inherency: Lots of evidence that the US is already unilaterally providing security and military assistance to lots of Asian countries. This evidence could easily tie in with the "US UNILATERAL" counterplan to make a powerful NEG response to any NATO-in-Asia Affirmative plan.

CHINA BAD - evidence showing that China is not a suitable partner for cooperation in Asia. Human rights violations, threatening Taiwan, transferring weapons to NATO's enemies -- no one should be proposing that NATO enter into any cooperative agreements with this international miscreant.

CHINA GOOD - There is no need to direct NATO into an alliance against China nor to worry about the ending of the European Union's arms embargo against China. The Chinese military threat is greatly exaggerated, both in terms of capabilities and intentions. Their military isn't that big and they aren't going to use it against the United States. In fact, treating China as an enemy will become a self-fulfilling prophecy: they will become an enemy if we treat them like one.

KOREA - There's no need for NATO involvement in Korea. South Korea can take care of itself, since it is larger in population and economic strength than its arch-enemy North Korea. The powers in the region -- China, Japan, South Korea and Australia -- are qualified to deal with the Korean situation, and they don't really need the US and NATO. In any case, the US already has an alliance with S. Korea, so there is nothing to be gained by adding another alliance with NATO.

TAIWAN - There is always tension between mainland China and Taiwan, and getting NATO involved is not the answer. The US and Japan are already allied with Taiwan, so there isn't much more for NATO to do. And China has two choices: It can take the peaceful development route, which it is pursuing today, and hope for a gentle reunification some day. If that happens, leaving the Status Quo alone is the best policy. But if China chooses military intervention to recapture the recalcitrant island, the evidence will show that they will not be deterred from that course of action no matter what anyone does. Getting outsiders involved would only make things worse.

Expansion Good or Bad?

One of the hottest issues ongoing in NATO today is the question of expansion. NATO started out as an alliance of 12 members in 1949. Today it comprises 26 nations and has an open door policy for more to join. But this expansion is controversial, and Affirmatives are sure to be running cases to either expand into new countries (to expand the benefits of NATO) or to block further expansion (to avoid antagonizing Russia, for example).

If an Affirmative runs a NATO expansion case, the material in the Blue Book Affirmative case for ending NATO expansion can be used to argue against it. See the article describing that case for ideas about why NATO expansion is a bad idea.

But if the Affirmative is reducing NATO or halting its expansion, Negatives must be prepared to argue that expansion is a good thing. The first line of defense against such cases is to use generic "NATO is Good" evidence to respond to whatever are the proposed harms that NATO is spreading by expanding. The second line of defense is the large EXPANSION OF NATO—NO PROBLEM brief provided in the Negative section of Blue Book.

The Negative Expansion brief shows that the alleged harms of expansion are not really a problem. Russia has gotten over whatever problems it once had with expansion and is no longer going to cause any problem about it. They aren't going to attack or go on the offensive if NATO expands a little more, so there's no need to worry about it.

NATO expansion is good for democracy. It strengthens and stabilizes the new democracies of Eastern Europe by setting standards of democracy they must meet before they join, and anchoring them solidly with the West after they join. Many of these nations once experienced domination by Russia in the Soviet era and want the security and stability of knowing that this can never happen again. In fact, these nations run a very serious risk of the disadvantage of losing their democracy to Russian interference if they do not get into NATO.

NATO Good, Bad or Irrelevant?

Negatives must be prepared to argue in both directions about supporting or rejecting the success of NATO. When Affirmative plans strengthen NATO, Negatives can run generic disadvantages if they can show that bad things will happen if NATO is stronger. But if Affirmatives weaken or abolish NATO, Negatives will want to respond by showing all the good things that will get cancelled if the plan is enacted, or to respond to Affirmative allegations of harmful failures of NATO by showing that NATO is really not failing in the Status Quo.

Our NATO GOOD brief shows that NATO is doing many wonderful things. NATO brings stability and security to struggling democracies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO also provides capabilities that would not be possible with just the US or some European nation operating alone. This gives NATO the ability to project power and solve problems in the world better than any of its alternatives.

NATO also provides a political framework in which US power can operate more effectively. The world is happier to see NATO intervention than US unilateral intervention because NATO can only intervene after a widespread consensus of its members agrees to the action. When the US stays within NATO for international action, many believe this acts as a moderating influence that keeps the US from getting out of control on the world stage. And although the US sometimes chooses to act with "coalitions of the willing," this brief shows that the permanent and stable NATO format is a much better alternative than alliances that come and go.

We also compare NATO specifically to its alternatives in NATO GOOD, which can provide evidence against Affirmative plans criticizing NATO as well as evidence against Negative counterplans proposing to use one of these alternative agencies instead of NATO. NATO is better than the European Union because the EU has only feeble military capabilities and cannot succeed without US support (which NATO has, but EU doesn't). NATO is better than the UN because even Kofi Annan admits that NATO has the capabilities lacking currently in the UN to do many types of operations. NATO is better than US unilateral action because the US cannot afford to 'go it alone' in current world struggles, and is discovering more and more that it needs allies to succeed.

Our NATO IRRELEVANT brief offers generic Solvency arguments to multiple Affirmative cases that might want to reform or use NATO to accomplish some new project or mission in the world. This brief argues that NATO is irrelevant because the threats it was designed for don't exist any more. NATO doesn't protect democracy and freedom because these issues aren't threatened in Europe today. In fact, NATO has really turned into more of a political club than a real alliance, since its real mission of collective defense has no urgency today.

This brief also shows that NATO has become too fractured and divisive to accomplish much anyway. With the need for 26 countries to agree on anything, with all their divergent interests, it's hard for NATO to be the first option to solve really serious or suddenly emerging problems. Recent experience with combat in Kosovo has left many experts with the impression that NATO is just too unwieldy to conduct a real war. Too many politicians with their fingers in the process make it a lot easier to just do it through unilateral action or coalitions of the willing. On top of that, there are serious doubts about whether NATO has the capabilities to really project much power anywhere. It's easy to see why the US ignored NATO during the immediate response to 9/11, even though NATO invoked Article V and offered help. It's just more hassle to use NATO than it's worth.

Here's a valuable tip: Always write a Negative brief against your own Affirmative cases. Do this for two reasons. First, it will force you to consider what things you need to prepare to win when in the Affirmative—you will know what evidence and arguments are available to others who know about your case. Second, since other debaters are as smart as you are and may have also thought of the same case, you are prepared to oppose the case if you ever have to go Negative against it.

-from *Strategic Debate*

NATO BAD is a brief useful for both Affirmatives and Negatives. Affirmatives can use evidence from it as harms for case ideas that change NATO to eliminate some of the bad things NATO is doing. Negatives can use it to show disadvantages to Affirmative plans that propose strengthening NATO.

Why would a stronger NATO be bad? First, because a weak NATO is good for Russia. Russia is happy if NATO is weak, and conversely they are unhappy if NATO gets stronger. Now is not the time to provoke Russia because that will trigger disadvantages related to loss of Russian cooperation on international issues like terrorism. It will also make Russia feel isolated and threatened, resulting in reversal of democratic reforms in the name of national security.

Second, a stronger NATO would promote higher defense spending among NATO members. Unfortunately, many of the Central and East European countries can hardly afford a stronger NATO at that price, and the social costs of trying to do that may hurt democracy more than not-strengthening NATO would.

Russia Good or Bad?

The state of relations with Russia will obviously be a big issue in many rounds this year. In a separate article, we analyze the current state of Russia's relations with the West. Keep in mind that the state of our relationship with a country can be good even if the country itself is doing bad things (for example, the US gets along well with Pakistan even though their military overthrew their democracy some years ago). Likewise, our relationship with a country can be bad even though they are a country that upholds democracy and human rights (think "US and France"). In this context, let's consider only Russia's own behavior and values, regardless of how good our relationship is, or should be, with Russia. To put it bluntly, is Russia right now trustworthy? or dangerous? Are they a stable democracy? or on the downhill slide of reversion to dictatorship? Are they advancing world peace and fighting terrorism? Or do they have their own hidden agendas, willing to say anything to keep the West from hurting their interests?

Expert evidence will appear in many rounds on both sides of this issue for good reason: There are lots of conflicting facts and opinions on both sides of these questions. Whatever your own personal opinions about this question, keep an open mind and be prepared to argue both sides of the matter, because you will have to do so sooner or later this year. We have two different briefs in Blue Book to help you: RUSSIA IS GOOD and RUSSIA IS DANGEROUS.

Our RUSSIA IS GOOD brief prepares you to show why any Affirmative plan that provokes or irritates Russia is a bad idea, and why any plan predicated on reacting to Russian danger is unnecessary. It argues that Russia has demonstrated its good intentions by its efforts against terrorism, citing Russia's assistance to the US anti-terrorism fight in Afghanistan. And consider Russia's management of its differences with NATO through dialog and negotiation rather than arms buildups and threats, like in the bad old days of the Soviet Union.

Sometimes the West complains about some incidents of Russian intervention in its neighbors' affairs. But looked at realistically, these are no worse than US intervention in the region and do not represent any significant threat to the West. After all, the US and NATO have troops in lots of countries that border Russia. Why is it a big deal if Russia has troops in countries that border Russia?

Internally, Russians want stability first and they're willing to worry about democracy later, in the opinion of some experts. They're happy with Vladimir Putin even though he has made some moves that some say stifle civil rights and the rule of law. The threats of terrorism and economic distress that constantly imperil the Russian people more than justify his efforts to unite Russia, strengthen the central state, and get a firm grip on these problems before they get out of control. In any case, Russia's elected parliament (the "Duma") and elected President are still a long way from the bad old days of communist dictatorship and the Evil Empire. Maybe the West should give Russia a break and stop nagging them about the little things, given how far they have come and how far they still have to go. Working with Russia will produce a lot more benefits than working against her.

If "Russia is Good," then it follows that there could be disadvantages to treating Russia badly. Negatives using the RUSSIA IS GOOD brief will be able to show that Russia can retaliate in several different ways to Affirmative plans that poke the Bear. For example, Russia could renew the arms race and increase the risk of nuclear war, or cut off energy supplies to Western Europe, just to name a few.

The responses to these arguments are in the RUSSIA IS DANGEROUS brief. This evidence shows that there are multiple reasons to distrust, dislike and remain on guard against Russia. Russia's external behavior is the first problem area. Her intervention in the affairs of neighbors is arguably blocking democracy and engaging in blackmail to coerce weaker countries to do Moscow's bidding. Russia intimidates the Baltic States, perhaps still resentful over their happy independence from Moscow's rule after 50 years of occupation. A common saying in Ukraine is: "Russia's democracy ends on the border with Ukraine," suggesting that Russia will interfere and subvert their efforts at establishing democracy in their own land.

Internally, Russia's behavior is troublesome as well. In May 2006, US Vice President Richard Cheney delivered a stinging speech in which he denounced Russian violations of civil rights in the areas of religion, the press, and political parties. President Putin has virtually declared war on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs - charities, human rights groups, for example) and some say the 2003 Russian elections were a sham.

Affirmative cases that promote good relations with Russia or that are predicated on good behavior by Russia will be vulnerable to the evidence in RUSSIA IS DANGEROUS. If NATO is in the business of promoting democracy, it has no business helping nor cooperating with a nation that violates so many principles of democracy as Russia does. If solvency depends on Russian cooperation, then the plan is doomed.

Russia Relationship

The state of relations with Russia will come up again and again, and it is a different question from the question of whether Russia is "good" or "bad." This question asks: How well do we (NATO, the West) get along with Russia? Even if they're "good," we might get along with them badly; and even if they're "bad," we might get along with them well. Blue Book supplies two briefs on the "relationship" issue: RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP BAD and RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP GOOD. As you might have guessed, there is lots of expert opinion on both sides of this issue.

RR-BAD argues that relations with Russia today are worse than they've ever been since the Cold War. Russia has established an anti-Western foreign policy and there is no way they will cooperate with the West on anything important. In the past, Russia was willing to put up with Western behavior they didn't like (NATO expansion, for example) because they needed good relations with the West during the difficult times after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But today, Russia doesn't feel that it needs good relations with the West because they are flush with cash from high oil prices. They can establish their own alliances and policies, stop listening to Western nagging, and feel free to antagonize the West if they want to.

RR-BAD is a brief useful for both Affirmatives and Negatives. Affirmatives can use it to defeat the uniqueness of disadvantages linked to "damaging the relationship with Russia." If the relationship is already broken in the Status Quo, then no Affirmative plan can be held responsible for breaking it after the Judge votes AFF. Negatives can use RR-BAD to defeat Affirmative solvency by showing that AFF plans that claim to improve NATO's relationship with Russia are doomed. They can never solve for all the issues in this shattered relationship and thus cannot achieve any goals relating to increased Russian cooperation.

RR-GOOD argues just the opposite. It gives Negatives material to show that there is no need to worry about improving relations with Russia because the relationship is doing just fine today. Russia does not consider NATO a threat, nor does NATO consider Russia one. NATO and Russia are cooperating on multiple issues, such as shipping in the Mediterranean and missile defense. And even if they do disagree on some things, those disagreements are minor and are being handled through fair dialog and open communication. War with Russia just isn't going to happen.

One must always consider what goes on behind the scenes. Even if a politician yaks about how he hates the West or wishes NATO would go away, that doesn't cancel the real-life good will being generated daily by numerous cooperation initiatives. Fighting terrorism and organized crime, Russia and the West work together well and need each other.

NATO has an official forum, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), in which Russia can consult and give input to NATO on issues that concern it. Russia also has diplomatic representation at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and NATO has an office in Moscow. Negatives can use RR-GOOD to show that the Status Quo is already cooperating quite nicely and there is no need for additional efforts to improve the Russia relationship. This brief can also be used to support the uniqueness of Negative "Broken Russia Relationship" disadvantages, by proving that the Status Quo is cooperating today, a benefit that would be disrupted if the Affirmative triggers a backlash.

Questions for Discussion

1. What are some good things about the status quo? Using the highlights in Chapters 2 and 3, defend the existing agencies and policies in place now.
2. Train yourself to attack case specifics and make on-case arguments. Using the case briefs in the back of the book, drill each other using common tags of the affirmative cases.
3. What would be a good situation to run a counterplan? When would it be a bad idea?
4. What are some good ways to combine generic evidence with specific evidence?
5. What should the negative team be arguing against Asian cases?
6. Should the negative team be prepared to argue both for and against expansion on NATO? What are some strategic ways to do this?
7. Is Russia good or bad in its relation to NATO? Explain.

6. Case Summaries

The Blue Book has traditionally taken the lead in defining the most popular debate cases for the school year. They aren't just taken out of mid-air. They are the result of years of experience in debating, competing, teaching and coaching. This year’s Blue Book is stocked with 12 debate cases, the core cases that you will hear a lot about throughout the season. Even if you branch off on your own and create a case unique to any of these, it would be wise to familiarize yourself with these 12, for they likely will pop up in debate rounds at your tournaments.

That’s All Folks: The Case for Abolishing NATO

NATO was once a vital part of US and Western European foreign policy, guaranteeing the security and freedom of Western democracies. Its mission to defend Western Europe against the Soviet threat was vital and provided a unifying theme to Western military and political cooperation. It provided a sense of security to millions of Europeans, who relied on the collective promise of mutual defense to sleep comfortably at night.

But times have changed. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the security situation in Europe radically different from where it was in 1949 when the NATO alliance was formed. Many believe that since the entire reason for the alliance's existence has disappeared, maybe the alliance should also disappear.

The case for abolishing NATO goes beyond eliminating useless dead weight. Many believe the benefits of abolishing NATO actually outweigh the risks of continuing it. For example, continuing (and even expanding, as NATO has been doing) to ally countries in Western Europe together suggests that they perceive an outside threat that only a common alliance of 26 nations can respond to. Where is that threat? Russia can only think of one answer to that question and takes great offense at the implications. After all, they have made great reforms since the bad old days of the Soviet Union. What did they get for their trouble? A bigger and wider alliance directed against them.

The security commitments in today's NATO are also a cause for alarm. Is it wise for the US to be in a treaty that commits the lives of its soldiers to defend places like Slovenia? Can you even locate Slovenia on a map? At some point, such commitments outstretch capabilities and put Americans unnecessarily in harm's way in conflicts that have no bearing on US security. Isn't there a point at which nations of the world learn to manage their own defense, or form their own local alliances, without reliance on the tired Titan?

There are also internal political reasons to abolish NATO. Time spent trying to get all 26 nations to agree on common policies and military interventions is time that could have been spent forming "coalitions of the willing" who could then go get the job done. In those situations, waiting for Iceland and Luxemburg to agree to some Western military action could actually be detrimental to mission success. Allies can be a good thing or a bad thing, depending on the context. Sometimes they help -- sometimes they just get in the way.

Enough Already: The Case for Stopping NATO Expansion

NATO won the Cold War as an alliance dedicated to deterring Soviet aggression. The "Evil Empire" went away, but NATO did not -- in fact, it continues to grow. The question is: Why?

This case is similar to the Abolish NATO case, in that it is premised on some of the same harms. NATO provokes Russia by being an alliance with no other obvious target besides what's left of the once formidable Soviet empire. But NATO-Russia relations could probably be salvaged if it weren't for the fact that NATO keeps inviting in new countries that used to be Russia's allies -- and some (the Baltic States) that even used to be part of the Soviet Union itself. It might not be necessary to abolish NATO altogether (and thus one can avoid the disadvantages associated with abolition) if halting NATO expansion would do the job. NATO could still exist as a strong and effective alliance, none of the abolish-NATO disadvantages would happen, and Russia would be much more cooperative because NATO is no longer expanding into her "sphere of influence."

NATO's expansion policy isn't over. As if growing to 26 countries weren't enough, NATO is currently considering adding Georgia, Ukraine, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. And NATO's Secretary General has officially declared that "NATO's door is open," meaning that there could be no end to NATO expansion unless the attitudes and policies of NATO are changed.

While it may seem irrational to us (after all, we -- the West -- know that we have "good intentions"), Russia's fears of expansion from the West are understandable in an historical context. Western Europe invaded Russia in the 1800s (Napoleon), during World War I (Germany) and during World War II (Germany again). Also, Britain, France, Canada, the US and other nations sent troops into Russia to intervene in the Russian Civil War between 1918-1920. Their mission failed and Americans forgot about it; but Russians never forgot.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and its aggressive posture retreated, Russians had the right to expect that the alliance formed to oppose it (NATO) would likewise stand down and a new era of understanding and cooperation could begin. In fact, Pres. George H.W. Bush promised that NATO would not expand to the east, and Russians believed him. Imagine their surprise when, under Presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush, NATO reversed that pledge and expanded right to Russia's western border. Russians feel encircled and betrayed, and it's hard to blame them.

There are other harms besides risk of conflict with Russia to this expansionary policy. For one thing, inviting Georgia into NATO is arguably a violation of international law, because Georgia has already signed a treaty with Russia promising not to do so. Also, at some point NATO becomes too big to be effective. Think about the political implications of getting more than 26 nations to agree on what day of the week it is, much less to agree on some international military action. And there are other harms involved with expansion of US intervention (viewing NATO as a proxy for the US, since the US is such a large component and the biggest influence over the alliance). At some point, NATO and the US are over-committed, and maybe that point is now.

To prepare an intro, you need to have an outline pre-flowed on your flowsheet that tells you the arguments you're going to make in your upcoming speech. That's partly what your prep time is for – to ensure that your arguments are outlined and organized before you make them.

-from *Strategic Debate*

Paper Tiger: The Case for Reforming the NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) originated from a proposal by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2002 as an effort to build European military strength and to project NATO power around the globe in crisis situations. It is scheduled to be completely operational in October 2006. Unfortunately, this case argues, the NRF is flawed and can never achieve its goals without significant reform.

NRF is "an integrated, combined force of 25,000 land, sea, air and special operations troops, all under one command, certified to handle seven distinct missions from forcible entry to humanitarian assistance." It represents the transition that NATO is trying to make from a static defensive alliance to one that can project power and solve problems anywhere in the world. If it works, it could keep NATO relevant and effective, able to react quickly to threats or even to proactively intervene should the need arise.

But there are some things blocking NRF from working today. The first is NRF's political constraints. NRF was designed to be able to deploy within five days. That's well and good, but what if it takes a month for the diplomats at NATO headquarters to agree on whether to use it? What if those diplomats then call their parliaments and wait a month to get approval? And what if the parliaments then insist on waiting (forever?) for a UN resolution? That five-day response time, even if they have the men and equipment to achieve it, is meaningless under those circumstances and the goal of rapid response will surely fail.

Another major impediment to NRF readiness is the question of whether the men and equipment will even be ready. Supreme Commander General James Jones warns that the current method of funding NRF puts the program at risk. Current funding is provided by the formula "costs lie where they fall." This means, if you (a NATO member country) supply forces to NRF, then you are responsible for paying for the costs of your forces. There is no pooled responsibility or common budget to pay for NRF. Guess what that does to the incentive for NATO members to participate fully in NRF?

This case argues that solving the political hassles and funding dilemmas would make NRF a functioning, rapid response unit that could be a force for good in the world. Streamlined decision-making would avoid the waiting and make the "response" force truly responsive. Common funding would take away the incentive to opt out and make all NATO countries full participants, ensuring that NRF is staffed and equipped to do its job.

No Place Like Home: The Case for Banning "Out-Of- Area" Missions

NATO was once a vital part of US and Western European foreign policy, guaranteeing the security and freedom of Western Europe. But times have changed. Today NATO finds itself in adventures that are far beyond the scope of its charter and beyond the limits of its competency -- missions that will get it into trouble and missions that really should be left to someone else, if they need to be done at all.

"Out of Area" (OOA) missions are military interventions or deployments (whether combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian, etc.) that take place outside the traditional European home of NATO. Examples include NATO's large deployment in Afghanistan and its small airlift mission to support international efforts in Sudan. This case argues that NATO should never deploy forces to countries that are not either in NATO or bordering a NATO ally.

OOA missions are becoming an increasing part of NATO's work. There may be several theories about the reasons why. It might be because the world views NATO as a competent organization that can "get things done," even tough jobs that require a lot of men and equipment that may not be available to many nations or international organizations. Alternatively, it may also be because NATO has run out of things to do now that the Cold War is over and needs busy-work to justify its existence and look relevant.

What's wrong with such deployments? First, it seems that Europeans have neither the power nor the will to sustain them properly. NATO can keep voting to go on more and more missions all over the globe, but if the Europeans won't fund them and send troops, how can the missions succeed? If the US is going to end up paying for them and manning them anyway, why go through the charade of NATO? And no need to create the divisiveness and rancor from debating missions that divide alliance members who are uncertain about how far afield their miniscule number of troops should be deployed. Such divisions hurt the alliance and reduce cooperation for possible future missions that really would be essential to the self-defense of its members.

Such deployments also arguably block the long-term success of NATO because they siphon away funding that is needed for a more urgent priority: the Prague Capabilities Commitments. These are commitments NATO members made about upgrading and modernizing their forces to be ready to meet modern challenges. Every mission NATO takes up that is outside its core duty to defend Europe is another distraction and reduction in available funding for that core mission. Let someone else deliver "meals on wheels" to the next earthquake or flood.

The other big reason to limit OOAs is the global intervention risk: More outside intervention in remote parts of the world fuels terrorism. It is a fact that a large portion of the anti-American/anti-Western terrorism that goes on in various parts of the world is the venting of anger at Western/US intervention (military presence) in the area. Though terrorism is a morally unjustified response, knowing the root cause can help prevent stirring it up in the future, and avoiding OOAs are a way to reduce the likelihood of future terrorism directed at us.

One final note: There is a difference between this OOA case and the Defense-Only case elsewhere in this book. OOA sets the criterion for NATO deployment simply by geography: If the proposed mission is in a NATO country or a bordering nation, then it's acceptable -- whether it is humanitarian, aggressive/pre-emptive intervention, defensive, etc. The Defense-Only case sets a "purpose" criterion for engaging in a NATO mission and has no geographical limits. The chart below shows the differences in the way these criteria would be applied to some sample NATO missions:

* **Mission OK under OOA-Ban? OK under Defense-Only?**
* Bosnia peacekeeping Yes - Bosnia borders NATO No - Bosnia didn't attack
* Bombing Kosovo/Yugo. Yes - Yugoslavia borders NATO No - Yugoslavia didn't attack
* Afghanistan intervention No - Afghanistan too far away Yes - Afghanistan attacked 9/11
* Darfur intervention No - Sudan too far away No - Sudan didn't attack
* Pakistan earthquake No - Pakistan too far away No - Pakistan didn't attack

"UN" Acceptable: The Case for Disengagement from the United Nations

NATO's pattern of cooperation with the United Nations isn't just a political policy or a gesture of good will. It's embedded in NATO's founding charter that the alliance should work with the UN. That seemed like a good idea in 1949 when that commitment was made. The UN was new and was the hope of millions for avoiding yet another devastating world war. Many thought that cooperation with the UN was the key to ensuring that NATO's missions were effective, globally supported, and justified by the international community.

Today the shine has come off the UN, at least for many. The UN's record over the last 60 years is littered with failure, inaction, being co-opted by dictators and despots, and hours spent talking while millions died. An organization that puts Libya on the "human rights committee" surely has little credibility in the real world, or so one would think.

But NATO continues to work with and through the UN on many occasions. Not every NATO mission is not blessed by the UN, but on many occasions NATO waits to get UN approval before taking action that NATO members believe is necessary. While waiting, if the situation is urgent and lives are at risk, people die while the UN talks, votes, negotiates, and fools around. Two examples are Darfur, Sudan and the Srebrenica massacre -- both occasions where NATO waits or waited for UN approval, and that waiting cost the lives of innocent people.

The human cost is significant but there is also a moral and political cost as well. Cooperation with the UN justifies and supports the undemocratic oligarchy known as the Security Council. Five self-appointed nations claiming to legitimize or reject action by 26 NATO members puts the cart before the horse: Why does the widespread consensus of NATO's 26 need legitimacy from a meeting of the UN's five? In fact, the UN is guilty of so many obstructions of good in the world, that NATO only lends legitimacy to evil when it cooperates with the UN.

At least, so argues this case. NATO can accomplish more by itself than through cooperation with the UN. Unleash NATO and let it do its job!

Deal With The Devil: The Case for Abandoning the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

"Cooperation" sounds like a wonderful thing, but it all depends on whom you're cooperating with and what you're helping them do. NATO held a meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2004 and decided to take several actions. One of them was a program of military cooperation with certain Persian Gulf nations known as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

"NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO. It focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field, starting with the individual members of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates." *(NATO Official Home Page, 9 June 2006, NATO TOPICS: Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),* [*www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html*](http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html)*)*

The ICI is not about offering NATO membership to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, but it nonetheless puts NATO in a position where an alliance of democracies is cooperating militarily with an alliance of monarchies who arguably have no interest in democracy. Since the stated goal of NATO is promoting democracy, this puts NATO in a bit of a moral quandary and in violation of its fundamental goal. It is promoting the very thing it was founded to oppose: oppression by non-democratic governments. There are no standards of democracy that are applied to screen countries that want to be part of the ICI.

Along the way, NATO also bumps against some international risks in addition to the political/moral ones. The GCC countries are potential targets of Iran's wrath or subversion, given their proximity to Iran, their history of cooperation with the United States, and their mistrust of their huge, radical, dangerous neighbor. Expanding NATO's presence in the GCC comes at a rotten time: relations with Iran desperately need improvement right now due to Iran's nuclear issues. And in general, outside intervention in the Middle East has frequently been a key lightning rod for terrorism.

Pulling out of the ICI would uphold democracy, reduce provocation of Iran, and leave defense of the GCC countries to other arrangements. It would also promote peace by letting the countries in the region develop on their own without Western militaries looking over their shoulder, taking away the motivation for terrorists angry at outside intervention.

Hard Currency: The Case for Fair Funding of NATO Operations

Because NATO is an alliance that must balance the competing interests of over two dozen nations, strains are bound to occur. The most important strains in any partnership are those about money, and NATO has financial issues that need to be addressed.

In the Status Quo, only a few things are funded jointly by a general NATO budget. The headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, for example, and NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft program. Most operations are funded instead by a principle called "Costs fall where they lie." This means that if a nation sends troops to participate in a mission, that nation pays for all of its own troops. If a nation sends planes or helicopters, that nation pays for the operation of that equipment. The costs of missions are not divided generally among all members of the alliance. This leads to a number of problems.

First, some nations always get stuck with the bill because they have capabilities that are always in demand. If one nation has equipment that is needed for every mission, and no other nation chooses to develop their capabilities to include that equipment, then every mission will require the capable nation to send its equipment and pay for it, every time. Not only is it unfair for the capable nation, but it provides a disincentive for other nations to ever develop or deploy such capabilities with NATO.

Missions are jeopardized as a result. The NATO Response Force (NRF), for example, depends on contributions of men and equipment from NATO members, yet the members have a big disincentive to supply the needed resources. Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been hampered by lack of resources due to the disincentives created by the current funding scheme. Everyone wants the missions to succeed, but no one wants to pay for them alone. Those who are willing end up giving a "free ride" to the slackers, who benefit from NATO's protections but slide away without paying their share of the costs.

There is a solution, and it's already working well for funding the few common assets that NATO has, and a modified version of it works well for the AWACS mission. The solution is a GDP (Gross Domestic Product - the sum of the value all goods and services produced in a country in one year) weighted formula for assessing each country in advance and paying the costs of missions out of the pre-budgeted assessments. A GDP formula calculates each country's fair share based on the size of their economy. If the US economy is 50% of the size of the total GDP of all NATO countries, then the US is assessed 50% of the budget for any mission NATO votes to approve. Likewise, if Luxemburg is 1% of the total of all GDP, then they will be assessed 1% of the costs, regardless of whether Luxemburg contributes any men or equipment.

Outvoted: The Case for Reforming NATO’s Decision-Making Process

NATO is in need of serious reform in order to be able to quickly respond to today's challenges to peace and security. The problem: NATO's process for reaching decisions binding on the alliance is slow, cumbersome and increasingly difficult as the alliance has grown and continues to grow.

NATO's decisions require "consensus" of all 26 members before a collective action can be taken. "All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent, a decision that is accepted by each member country." *(NATO Official Web Page, NATO TOPICS, 1 Mar 2005, "Consensus decision-making at NATO - A fundamental principle,"* [*www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html*](http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html)*)*

In practice, NATO has an interesting way of achieving the unanimous consent of all 26 members. Greatly simplified, when a proposal is developed for action (let's say, NATO invading East Slobonia), the proposal is written up and sent around to all the NATO member representatives. They look it over, consult with the political leadership in their home country, or do whatever it takes for them to decide whether they like it or not. They also talk it over among other NATO representatives and negotiate, if possible, to make it more like what they want it to be ("let's do an air campaign only, no ground troops, in East Slobonia"). The "voting" process happens in reverse: When the deadline for approval arrives, if no one has "broken silence" on the issue (i.e., filed an official objection), then the mission is approved. This allows members some political cover to avoid having to take a public stand on any issue by never actually voting for it or against it. It also gives any one member the power to stop the other 25 from doing anything. If one member files an objection, it's "game over."

For an alliance that claims to be transitioning to rapid response to global crises, this is an incredibly cumbersome process. The NATO Response Force, for example, is intended to be able to activate within five days. But there would seem to be no way to use it rapidly if all these meetings and negotiations have to occur to be sure all 26 countries agree with the plan. In the age of terrorism and WMD proliferation, use of the NRF or any other NATO response in a crisis cannot wait that long.

But beyond emergencies, the ordinary processes of NATO can also get bogged down. One nation can throw a wrench in the process any time they don't like something. Tiny countries who contribute almost nothing to NATO can stop important work by the countries that are bearing the burdens and paying the costs.

One proposed solution in the Status Quo is CJTF, the Combined Joint Task Force option. This is an option where countries who want to engage in a mission can get willing NATO nations to join them and carry it out, while countries who disagree with the mission can stay home. Negative teams are sure to raise this as an inherency argument, but Affirmatives running this plan have some responses. First, the CJTF mechanism has been in existence for over 10 years, yet NATO leaders today are still complaining about the consensus process and how it blocks important work. If CJTF were a viable solution, it should have worked by now. Also, CJTF is not intended for all NATO missions, but only certain functions. There are still many things left that NATO needs to do that cannot effectively be done by CJTFs.

The real solution is to abandon consensus in favor of a majority-vote system. Such a system would allow NATO's important work to get done faster and more efficiently, and give NATO a much better crisis response ability.

Inside the Lines: The Case for a Defense-Only Alliance

***NOTE: This case is offered as a free download by Training Minds Ministry (see*** [***www.trainingminds.org/downloads***](http://www.trainingminds.org/downloads)***). Debaters should expect this case—and variations of this case—popular at homeschool tournaments.***

Maybe Leo Tolstoy said it best: "What an immense mass of evil must result from allowing men to anticipate what might happen." NATO's original purpose was to defend Western Europe from outside attack, and it performed that job perfectly. But after the Cold War, NATO abandoned that successful strategy in favor of trying to guess what might happen and using armed intervention against those who had neither attacked nor threatened to attack any of its members.

NATO got along for about 50 years without ever considering any non-defensive deployments. But after the Cold War ended (some would say NATO was searching for something to do), NATO began deploying forces for missions unrelated to defending its member states. In one case, Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO began bombing (without the acceptance of the UN) a country that had neither attacked nor threatened to attack any NATO member.

NATO's intervention in the civil war in Bosnia in the mid-'90s and the bombing of Yugoslavia in '99 to bring pressure on Slobodan Milosevic to change his ways, began a pattern many find to be dangerous. Many of the same concerns you've heard about US intervention in Iraq (not supported by the international community, imposing Western solutions on local problems, imperialistic, causes more harm than good even if it started with good intentions, puts our forces at risk with no national interest at stake) were also heard in 1999. Oddly enough, some of the same European allies who supported NATO bombing Yugoslavia without UN permission under Democratic President Bill Clinton opposed US intervention in Iraq without such permission under Republican George W. Bush. Sometimes politics gets in the way of sound policy, and it is important to separate the two. This case is about establishing a stable, consistent policy that gives a sure bright line for justifying or rejecting every military intervention that NATO might consider from now on.

Lack of such a bright line arguably causes division and weakens the alliance today. Every time a mission is proposed, alliance members must go back and forth debating all of the political issues described in the paragraph above. Lack of a bright line means the alliance is always looking for things to do to justify its existence or to appear relevant in the modern world. That search for a mission can arguably make NATO take on things it should never have gotten into, rather than just doing what it has always done best: Defend Europe.

The arguments justifying NATO's abandonment of its historical defense-only posture are strong, but highly debatable and can be defeated by a sharp team. The most important is the need for "pre-emption" -- the doctrine that a military strike against an enemy who has not yet attacked you can be justified if the enemy was threatening or in process of initiating an attack. For example, if the US had found out what Japan was doing and had attacked Japan on Dec. 6, 1941, one could justify that attack on "pre-emption" grounds.

There are a number of responses -- some general and some specific to NATO -- that can defeat NATO's pre-emption posture. First, take the Pearl Harbor example again: Japan's attack was itself a pre-emptive attack against the US, because they believed the United States would sooner or later declare war on them (and they were probably right). Who gets to pre-empt whom? It isn't only NATO or the United States that can use pre-emption, and we frequently don't like it when other nations follow our example. Pearl Harbor is only one example of a pre-emption we would find repugnant, but which was justified in the eyes of its perpetrator.

Second, when has NATO ever successfully pre-empted anything? Bombing Yugoslavia didn't pre-empt an attack because Yugoslavia had not threatened to attack any NATO country. It would be hard to point to any NATO non-defensive intervention and show that it has ever successfully thwarted an attack.

That leads to the practical objection: Even if pre-emption can be justified in some cases, is NATO the right vehicle for doing it? Many believe NATO should be pre-empting terrorism by military action. Well and good, but by what mechanism? Remember that before NATO can launch a military mission, all 26 nations must have meetings, deliberations, negotiations and reach a conclusion in Brussels before one soldier can depart on the pre-emptive mission. Won't the bad guys hear about all those meetings and press conferences and, during the month of deliberations, go hide somewhere? Or speed up their attack? Or otherwise make plans to avoid the pre-emption that might be coming next month after NATO votes on it? If pre-emption is justified, someone who can act quickly should do it, not NATO.

No Strings Attached: The Case for Ending National Caveats

NATO has powerful military forces that can accomplish a lot of good in the world. But their effectiveness is often blocked by a structural defect that NATO's supreme commander wants desperately to eliminate.

Caveat: A Latin word meaning "let him beware." It has a specific meaning in the context of NATO military rules. "NATO officials use the term caveat to describe restrictions that different countries place on military action by their forces" *(Ahto Lobjakas, 13 Feb 2006, "Afghanistan: ISAF Expands And Prepares For Long-Term Stay," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)*

Every NATO country that contributes forces and equipment to a NATO mission has the right to place restrictions on how their resources will be used. Those restrictions could be based on safety regulations limiting the use of certain types of equipment, political considerations given by the national parliament on where/how their troops can be deployed, etc. Some real-life examples: No Afghans may ride on our nation's helicopters in Afghanistan; our aircraft cannot be used after dark; our troops cannot engage in combat; our troops may not use tear gas for crowd control.

NATO commanders, all the way up to Supreme Commander Gen. James Jones, complain publicly about these caveats and advocate eliminating them. When the commander on the ground has helicopters he cannot use or planes he can't fly or troops who cannot fire a gun because of political restrictions made by politicians (who said they supported the mission!), it becomes very difficult to successfully carry out operations on the ground.

Making matters worse, some of the caveats are hidden and are only revealed at the last minute after the troops or equipment are deployed. After the bullets start flying, imagine what would happen if the commander learns that half of his troops are going to retreat back to base because they are not authorized to engage in combat. Policies like that can cost lives.

There are lots of NATO insiders and experts who advocate removal of caveats. In fact, on some missions and in some cases, NATO has learned from its mistakes and has removed or reduced them. But NATO still has many in place and has not reformed the basic rules of the alliance to ban them in the future. Caveats will be a recurring problem until and unless NATO is reformed to permanently eliminate them.

Let’s Make A Deal: The Case for Ratifying the C.F.E. Treaty

Russia, the US, and many European countries have signed a treaty that promises to reduce tensions in Europe and bring benefits to many nations. The Russian government has ratified it, but it waits in vain for NATO to respond, and this case argues that NATO should stop stonewalling and ratify the treaty.

The treaty in question is the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE Treaty. CFE is rather complex, but its overall goal is to establish limits on the number of conventional forces (i.e., not relating to nuclear weapons) in Europe in order to reduce tensions and the likelihood of war. There are complex calculations of the number of tanks, artillery and other equipment and provisions for inspection and verification that the limits are being followed. The limits are set not only for quantity but for location as well. For example, Russia may be limited in how many tanks it can locate in a zone in the southwestern part of its territory, and another limit on tanks in the northwest, etc.

CFE negotiations originally began as a way to reduce Cold War tensions between NATO and the Soviet Union. But Cold War suspicions delayed acceptance of a workable treaty until the first CFE was signed in 1990, in the final days of the USSR after it had already begun to make dramatic reforms in its international posture. Many experts believe the original CFE worked well, but it became increasingly difficult to apply because the map of Europe changed so dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A number of new countries that did not exist in 1990 needed to be brought into the treaty (for example, Slovakia and Georgia). And the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) regained their independence from Russia and did not consider themselves to be successors of the former Soviet state, and thus are not bound by CFE at all.

To resolve these issues, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, which is not part of NATO) held a conference in Istanbul in 1999 to generate a new CFE. The "Adapted CFE" treaty was signed by 30 nations covering NATO plus former members of the Soviet Union. However, the Baltic States could not sign it because they were not signatories to the original CFE treaty and were not successors to the Soviet Union. The Adapted CFE treaty cannot admit new members until it is ratified by all 30 signatories, so the Baltic States will have to wait to join CFE until ratification happens. Russia and a couple other former Soviet republics have ratified Adapted CFE, and they are waiting impatiently for NATO to ratify it as well.

Ratification is being held up by political disputes over some other agreements that also were made at Istanbul at the same time as the Adapted CFE was created. The Istanbul meeting also reached the conclusion that Russia should withdraw its troops from bases in Georgia and Moldova. There are two big issues here: 1) are those side agreements conditions for ratification of Adapted CFE? or were they just additional agreements that happened to be made at the same conference? 2) has Russia met the obligations required by those agreements? And if not, what does Russia have left to do?

NATO's position on #1 is that the side agreements were intended to be conditions for CFE ratification. Not surprisingly, Russia disagrees. But the official position of the NATO alliance is that NATO member nations will not ratify the Adapted CFE until Russia meets the conditions in the Georgia/Moldova side agreements.

On issue #2, there are conflicting opinions. Russia has a troop-withdrawal and monitoring agreement with Georgia and claims they are removing equipment from its old Soviet-era bases there. In Moldova, Russia says it has pulled out all but 500 troops, and those left are said to be guarding an arms depot that would be too dangerous to abandon. In any case, Russia argues that there was no timeframe on the withdrawals in any Istanbul commitment, so these cannot be used as excuses to block ratification of CFE. NATO continues to hold these issues as reasons why its members will not ratify CFE.

Why does CFE matter? Russia says NATO's blockade of CFE is the most important issue hurting NATO-Russia relations today, and has repeatedly held NATO responsible to do something about it. Russia desperately wants the Baltic States covered by CFE because they want limits on arms buildups in these nations out of fears for the security of the Russian homeland. Acceptance by NATO would not completely implement CFE (Georgia and Moldova are also signatories and would have to ratify it as well), but it would solve a huge issue that is aggravating Russia in the Status Quo, and would significantly improve Russia's confidence and cooperation with NATO.

Penalty Box: The Case for Internal Discipline and Sanctions on Turkey

NATO is supposed to be an alliance of democracies that uphold freedom and human rights as an example to the world. But NATO today has neither the mechanism nor the will to uphold those standards upon its own members, and one of its members is falling far short of what the world has a right to expect.

It may be surprising to learn that NATO today has no mechanism for internal discipline. That is, if one of its members starts misbehaving, there is no provision in the founding treaty nor any agreements since then that would give NATO a process for applying sanctions or expelling the offender from the alliance.

This is important because over the years some NATO members have had some serious problems that would seem to make them unworthy to be in an alliance that claims to uphold democracy. Portugal had no problems with NATO membership even when it was ruled by a dictatorship. Greece and Turkey have both suffered government takeovers that eliminated democratically elected governments. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, in which Turkey expelled Greek residents from its occupied zone, also inflamed relations between the two NATO members and aroused the wrath of the international community for the aggressive military incursion and human rights violations. Turkey still occupies a chunk of Cyprus to this day.

That leads into the other part of this case: Applying some internal NATO sanctions to Turkey. Many argue that if the purpose of NATO is to uphold democracy, the best place to start upholding it would be among its own members. Turkey has a democratically elected government, "but..." Turkey's democracy is under the firm hand of the military, which has been known to remove democratically elected governments that did not meet with their approval. Turkey also has a number of laws that deny basic civil rights such as freedom of the press and freedom of speech. For example, it is a crime in Turkey to "malign Turkishness," whatever that means. And NATO has not adequately dealt with Turkey about resolving the Cyprus issue.

If NATO wants to get serious about upholding democracy and human rights, as it claims for its goals, it needs to first establish a sound mechanism for sanctioning its own members when they violate those goals, and then make an example out of Turkey, to show that the values NATO stands for are truly upheld, and are not just hypocritical words directed at the rest of the world.

Questions for Discussion

1. If NATO were to be abolished, what grounds would this action be founded on as a reason for doing so? Is NATO really a worthless organization? Explain.
2. Review the problems presented in the "no-expansion" case. Is NATO to blame for the promise made to Russia, or is George H.W. Bush? Could a minor repair be made to close expansion to the East?
3. If all of the NATO members were required to provide substantial participation in reforming the NRF, would it help in solving for the member-expansion issue? Why or why not?
4. Does the "Area" in an OOA mission have more to do with land or importance? Does this area of importance have to do with the countries inside NATO (safety and peacekeeping)? Is it necessary to send OOA missions to these areas?
5. Does the UN have an impact on NATO's work? If so, is it for the better or for the worse?
6. How does NATO relate to the ICI? How would stopping this relation help the ruling of democracy?
7. As with the NRF case, could the fair funding be used to help solve other case harms as well? Which cases could be solved?
8. Is NATO's decision-making process to blame for slowness, or is the UN's? Could reforming one take care of the other? Which would be more effective?
9. If NATO solved its speediness problem, would that resolve the harms presented in the defense-only alliance case? Could this be used as a negative argument for this plan?
10. What is preventing NATO's Supreme Commander from ending National Caveats? Are National Caveats as bad as they are made out to be?
11. Is the C.F.E. Treaty significant to NATO?
12. For the internal discipline case, how would disciplinary actions be made? What good would they do?

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)